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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

I~EXNETH ,,~RITE,

.App-ellant,
YS.

No. 6218
• KENNETH J. PINNEY, doing business as the PINNEY BEVERAGE
CoiVIPA~Y, and A. C. NEsLEN,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FA·CTS
Ordinarily the respondent neHd make only a very
short resume of the facts involved. But in the present
appeal the appellant's Abstract of Record is so incomplete, sketchy and garbled and his Statement of Facts
in his brief so one-sided that the respondent deems it
necessary, in the interest of fairness, to present the
facts more fully than is usually required.
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THE SURROUNDING CONDITIONS.
The accident here involved occurred on December
23, 1938, at about 4:30 P. M. and on Highland Drive
in the vicinity of a florist's shop numberHd 2333 on that
street. This is about two blocks south of the Sugar
House business district. At this point the street is over
40 feet wide; paved with block asphalt over cement;
a street car track was located in the center; and in general the surface was rough, (.White, Tr. 27-28). Highland Drive just s-outh of Sugar House is extensively used
by motor vehicles and on the day of the accident-just
two days before Christmas-the traffic was particularly
heavy, (White, Tr. 28). The plaintiff had parked his
own truck on the west side of the street opposite 2333,
the Maxwell Floral Shop. The truck faced south, was
parallel to the cement curh and only a few inches away
from the curb. The street was dry and visibility was
good.
THE PLAINTIFF 'S· ACTION'S.
After parking his truck the plaintiff crossed the
street to the Maxwell F1oral Shop, conversed with Mr.
Maxwell and returned to his truck. Then Mr. Maxwell
joined him to accept delivery of ·Some flowers.

Both

stood at the back or north end of the truck facing it,
White just to the west of Maxwell. White testified that
prior to and at the time of the accident he did not even
look to the east across the street or to the north or south
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to see if he 'Yas in any danger from passing vehicles,
(TI". 28-29).
\\1lile so standing, \\Thite was struck on the left front
part of his left leg about six inches above the bottom of
his foot. He testified that the impact knocke·d his foot
off the ground and caused the back part of the same
leg· to strike ag·ainst the bottom edge of the open truck
door. He picked up the object which struck him and
discovered it to be a small metal wheel about six or
seven inches in diameter, with a hard rubber tread and
weighing· about seven pounds. White then looked out
on the street and sa'v the defendant's truck going north.
\\~bite did not see the truck at all until it was already
150 to 200 feet past him, (Tr. 9, 29). He then got in his
own truck, turned around t.o the north and follo-wed the
defendant's truck to the Dixie Inn, about 2160 South
Highland Drive, and just south of the Southeast Furniture Company, where the driver of the defendant's truck
stopped to make a delivery .of beer.
THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCK.
The truck belonged to the Pinney Beverage Company
and was a four cylinder, llfz ton International. At the
time of the accident, its load consisted of slightly over a
ton, including two barrels of beer and the balance in cases
of bottled beer, (Neslen, Tr. 127-128).

The defendant,

N eslen, was the regular driver of this particular truck
and be had the witness, Sharp, as his helper. To assist
in delivering barrels of beer to customers, the Inter-
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national truck had as part of its regular equipment a
small hand truck. This hand truck was carried underneath the left side ·of the truck body and. was securely
attached to the chassis by some clamps at both ends. In
the travelling position the handles were on the inside
and the wheels on the outside, (Neslen, Tr. 128-129).
Both the driver, Neslen, and his helper, Sharp, testified
that the hand truck was in its regular position at the
time of the accident, and was never carried in any other
n1anner; but White claimed that when he saw the big
truck at the Dixie Inn immediately following the accident, the little hand truck was hanging in some manner
from the left top side of the truck body.
At the request of the attorney for the plaintiff and
with the consent of the attorney for the defendants, the
jury was allowed by the Court to take a view of the
International truck with the hand truck in place. The
hand truck was later brought into Court and exhibited
to the jury separately.
The tw·o wheels on the hand truck are held in place
on the shaft by cotter pins, (Neslen, Tr. 149). Neslen
greased the wheels once or twice a week, (Neslen, Tr.
149), and in so doing had never noticed anything out of
order. The hand truck had been used several times on
the day of the accident, the last time being at Murray,
from where the defendant's truck was driven to make a
delivery at 48th ·south and Highland Drive and thence
along the latter street to the scene •of the accident. When
used in Murray, the hand truck from all appearances
"ras in perfect working order.
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THE ACCIDENT.
Having· n1ade deliYery of some barrels of beer at
:Jlurray with the use of the hand truck, Neslen drove the
Internationftl truck to 48th South and Highland Drive
to leave some bottled beer and then drove north towards
Sug·ar House.

X eslen testified that \vhen he passed

the site of the accident, he \Vas driving 20 to 25 miles
an hour, (Tr. 13:2), and his helper, Sharp, agreed, (Tr.
134), but

\\~hite

\vho never saw the truck until it had

gone past him 150 to 200 feet guessed the speed at 50
mile-s per hour (Tr. 9, 10).
Xeslen passed by the plaintiff without knowing anything· had happened and proceeded on to the Dixie Inn
at :2160 Highland Drive.

The plaintiff never saw the

defendant's truck until after the wheel had hit him. At
the Dixie Inn immediately thereafter, White showed
Keslen the wheel and Neslen, upon investigation, found
it had become detached from the hand truck.

That was

the first information Neslen or Sharp had that an accident had occurred.
There is no evidence in the record to show hovv the
wheel became detached ·Or that either of the defendants
I

had previously known

~of

any defect on the hand truck.

In fact, all the evidence is undisputed that the routine
inspections and lubrication of the hand truck once or
twice weekly had shown no defects in it.
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TI-IE PL·AINTIFF'S INJURIES.
The blow struck by the wheel on the front part of
the plaintiff's leg was not a cut but ~only a bruise, (Dr.
Clawson, Tr. 80, 81). No surgery or treatment of any
kind was necessary or given. On the back of the leg was
a cut about 1j2 inch long and not deep, (Dr. Clawson,
Tr. 79). White saw Dr. Clawson the next day after
the accident at the latter's office and drove his own truck
from East Mill Creek to Salt Lake City to do so, (Tr.
18-20). Within the next week or ten days, he saw the
doctor twice more at the latter's office, but all medical
treatment was completed about January 1st, slightly
more than a week ·after the accident.
White continued to drive his truck and with a helper
delivered his flowers. He admitted he never lost a day's
work, (Tr. 19-21), following the accident but claimed
to have undergone some pain and suffering.
The plaintiff is 33 years old, weighs 212 pounds,
lost no weight following his mishap and his appetite
remained unimpaired, {White, Tr. 44-45).

BRIEF O·F ARGUMEN·T.

I.
The defendants were not liable for any latent defect
in the mechanism of their truck of 'vhich they had no
knowledge' and which a reasonable inspection and maintenance did not reveal.
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A.

The undisputed evidence shows that the defend-

ants had no knowledge of any such defect and that a
reasonable inspection and use of the hand truck had not
revealed it.

B. The plaintiff offered no evidence whatsoeve,r that
the defendants had knowledg·e of such a defect or that they
were in any manner negligent in their inspection, maintenance or use of the hand truck.
II.
Under the pleadings and in accordance with the evidence presented on the oontributory negligence of tlie
plaintiff, the District Court was not only wholly justified
but compelled to instruct thte jury on that subject, particularly when the plaintiff-appellant himself requested such
instructions; and the Court's instructions, so given, are
entirely correct.
Til.

Under the facts of this case the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply and the plaintiff was certainly not
entitled to a peremptory instruction that the defendants
were negligent as a matter of law; but in that connection.
the District Court went as far as possible in its Instruction
No. 14 in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that the situation warranted an "inference of negligence."
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.ARJGUME'NT.
While ~the appellant states s-even points in his brief
i·n support of his appeal, they can be 1boiled down to three
contentions, namely:
(a) That the District c·ourt'·s instructions regarding the supposed defe0t in the defenda:n ts' truck whi.ch
caused the wheel to be-come loose were erroneous.
(h) That the District Court's instructions on the
subject of contributory negligence were erroneous.
(.c) That under the doctrine of res ipsa. loquitur the
DiSJtrict Court ·should have g:r.a'nted a directed verdict
for the plaintiff.
Tlhe respondent will discuss these propositions in the
order just enumerated, although a different order is used
in the appellant's brief.

I.
The defendants were not liable for any latent defect
in the mechanism of their truck of which they had no
knowledge and which a reasonable inspection and maintenance did not reveal.
A. The undisputed evidence shows that the defendants had no knowledge of any such defect and that a reasonable inspection and use of· the hand truck had not
revealed it.
B. The plaintiff offered no evidence whatsoever that
the defendants had knowledge of such a defect or that they
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were in any manner negligent in their inspection, Inaintenance or use of the hand truck.

(Court's Instructions Nos. 1'2, 13, & 14).
B·efore presenting· the authorities on 1the duty of the
defendants in this resp·ec.t, it will be helpful to revievv
the facts concerning· it.
N eslen, the driver o.f the defendants' truck and his
assistant, Sharp, never even knew any accident had happened until the plaintiff ·showed them the little wheel from
the hand truck at the Dixie Inn shortly after it had struck
the plaintiff. Until that time they were wholly unaware
that the wheel had come off. Indeed the undisputed testimony shows· that they h·a·d used the han·d tru·ck all morning and afternoon, the last time at Murray less than an
hour before the accident took plaee-and that a.t all th·ese
times, the truck appeared in entirely p:voper woTking
order.
Neslen testified that he had driven th·e International
truck with the accompanying hand truek for at least a
year without any trouble. Moreover, he had lubricated
and inspected the wheels on the hand tru~ck regularly once
or twice a week, (T. 149), and found everything in proper
order.

The previous use ,o.f the hand truck on the day

of the mishap showed the same result. Thus the evidence
is entirely without any dispute wJhatsoever that the defendants had no knowledge of any defect regarding the
wheels on the hand truck and although a rea.so!lahle in-
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speetion, made regularly, had been made, they knew of
no defect whats·oever.
On the other hand, the plaintiff did not offer one
wovd of ·evidence in the entire case concerning .any supposed knowledge of a defect on the pa.rtt of the defendants. Neither wa.s the slightest evidence produced that
the inspection regularly carried ·On by the defendants was
either negligent or unreasonable under the .circumstances.
All that 1the record shows is that the plaintiff, while standing ·On the west side of a well traveled hi~hway, was
struck on the leg by a little wheel. He never ·saw the
wheel before it struck him and never saw th·e def.endants'
truck until it wa.s 150 to 200 feet past him going north.
La.ter it ·developed that the wheel had beeome d·etached
from the defendants' ihand truck.
Thus the reco-rd is completely silent as to any negligent aets or omissions of duty ·On the part of the defendants. The respondents were an·d still are firmly of
the opinion that, on the re-cord, the District Court should
have granted the defendants' motion for a non-suit and
certainly their motion for a directed ve:vdict.
There is now, and for many years has been, no dispute in the rule of law fixing the responsilbili ty of the
owner of a motor vehicle for defects in his machine.
First we cite from the most recent texts ~on automobile
laws:
Blashfield: Cyclopedia. of Automobile Law arnd
Practice, Sec. 233.3, ( 1936) :
4
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~~Save

\Yhere definite statutory requirements
respecting the necessary equipment of motor vehicles are not complied 'Yi th, s:O· as to 1nake out a
case of negligence per se b~T reason thereof, the
general rule respecting injuries attributable to defects in the eondi tion of t~he automobile is that a.
gratuitous inYi,tee riding therein as the guest of
the owner, or driver, accepts the machine ·of his
host as he finds it, subject to the limitation that
the host must not in effect se1t a trap by knowingly
or .eulpably exposing invi tees to the risk created
by a known or obvious defect in the auto.mobile
or otherwise be guilty of active negligence in this
connection contributing to the injury of guests.
A tra:p, within the m-eaning of such rule, is a hidden danger lurking u·pon the premises, or in the
automobile which is known to the host or should
be kno-w·n to him in the disc~arge of the duty for
a passenger's safety whic.h the law imp-oses on
him and which the guest may avoid if he knows
of it.
Stated differently, he is not liable for injuries
suffered iby guests by reason of the defective condition ·o.f the automobile, in the absence of some
showing, that he knew, or, in the exercise for the
safety of gratuitous passengers, should have
known, of the existence of the def.ect, the question
of whether he did have such knowledge or notice
·of the defe·ct as to render him liable being one of
fact.
The fact that the me~hanical defect productive of the injury is one discoverable upon an inspection of the .car does not show negligence on
the part of the host nor authorize a. reco;very by
the guest, and gross negligence cannot be p-redicted upon a. failure to inspect the v·ehicle thorouo-hly before inviting another to ride; 11he motoris·{is duty in this ennne·ction, if any, being limited
to the exercise of slight care. If he thinks the
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automobile is in good or reasonably safe condition, although it is not, that ordinarily relieves
him from any liability for defects therein.''
While the rule stated applies to passengers, it is
equally pertinent to eas·es of injury suffered by 01ther
persons as in the present case.
3 Hu.ddy: ·Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, (9th ed.),

.sec. 71:
''~Generally .speaking, it is the duty ,of one
operating a motor vehicle on the public :highways
to see that it is in reasonably good -condition and
properly equipped, so ·that it may be .at all times
con trolled, and ·not be,come a source of danger to
its occupants or to other travelers.

To this end, the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle must exercise reas·onable ear·e in the inspection of the machine, and is chargeable with
notice of everything ·that .such inspe,ction would
disclos-e. T1his rule applies whether the operator
is the owner of the vehicle or rents it from another, or permits another to use it, or lets it to another for hire. But, in the aibsence of anything to
show that the appliances were defective, the owner
or driver is not required to ins.pe.ct them before
using the car or permitting it to be used.''
Innum·erable .cases may be found which hold no liability on the part of the owner

~rhere

an outsider has

been injured by a defective .mechanism which was unknown to the owner and had not been disclosed by a reas-onable inspe.c.tion. ·Only a few of the m·ore recent cases
will be

~i ted.
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Ph ill ips l'. PickuN~ck Stages,
·
(California _..'-\ pp., 1927), 259 P. 968.
Her-e the plaintiff wns injured as t1he defendant's bus
struck hiln, \\~hen the driYer \Yas unable to stop the lbus
because the foot brake pedal suddenly broke. The verdict
for the plaintiff \Yas upheld because of the defendant's
violation of a statute, but on the point involved here the
Calif.ornia. Court stated:
Appellant contends that t1he accident was
caused -solely by the sudden breaking of the f.oot
peda.l, due to a. latent defect therein, not known to
defendant and not disc-overable upon a most careful inspection, and that there was no negligence
upon the part of the defendant. ·Concededly, if the
s-ole proximate cause .of the accident vva.s due to
the breaking of the foot ·p·edal due to a latent defect which eould _not have been dis.c.overed upon a
careful examination and inspection, appellant
would not be liable. ''
H

Bolin~

v. Corliss Company,
(Mass., 1928), 159 N. E. 612.

The tire and rim of the defendant's .car became deta·ched from the wheel and, after rolling across the street,
struck the plaintiff. U·nder facts vvhich the opinion states,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined
th-ere was no liability.
"The second count is to tjhe effect that it vva.s
the defendant's duty bef-o-re permitting the use
of the automobile upon the public highways to
have the automobile in reasonably saf.e condition;
that 'the defendant negligently permitted said
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automobile to go out upon the highway in. such a
defective and dangerous ,condition that a t1re and
rim ·came off and s·eriously injured the plaintiff.'
There was no·thing to show that, at the time the
defendant gave permission to Casper to· use the
automobile, it had any knowledge the machine was
then defective or unsafe for use on the public
highways; and no- ·evidence to support the plaintiff's .contention that at t1hat time the rim or tire
was defective, or, even if it vvere defective, that
reasonalble inspection would have disclosed its
condition. Assuming that the defendant would
be liable in. permittitn.g Casper to use a. defective
automobile when it knetv of the defect or, as a
reasonably prudent person, could ha:ve discovered
it, the plaintiff did not show that the defendant
pos-sessed such kno-vvledge or that the defect, if it
then existed, mig1ht reasonably have bee:n discovered." (Italics ours.)
Westlund v. Iverson,
(Minn., 1922), 191 N. W. 253.

While driving along a road the left rear wheel of the
defendant's automobile became detached, rolled onto an
adja.c.ent footh pat1h and struck the plaintiff. There was
no evidence of previous kno\vledge of any defective condition or of faulty inspection by the defendant. The Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained a. directed verdict
in favor of the defendant.
Flores v. Sullivan,
(Texas, 19·37), 112 S. W. ( 2d) 321.

The defendant taxi cab driver had a spare wheel .se·curely fastened on the rear ·of his cab. A negligent driver
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of another ra.r strnrk the cab and broke the spare wheel
loost"). It rolled into the street and struck the plaintiff.
It \Yas held that in the absence of an~T proof that the spare
tire 'Yas not fastene·d securely, th·e plaintiff eould n-ot
reeoYer, such a remote .contingency as actually occurred
not being reasonaibly foreseeable.
Cherry L~ke Farms v. Taylor,
(1939), 98 F. (2d) 571;
Phillips c. Britannia Laund1"Y Co·.,
(England, 19·23), 12 B. R. C. 418, 437.

See also the numerous case·s cited in foot notes by
Blash:field and Huddy, quoted above.
The appellant complains that! the \District c·ourtt.

.

erred in its instructions on the question of the defendants' actual knowledge and negligent insp·ection.

To

support his argument he plucks out part of the last sentenee of Instruction 13 and places a far fetched interpretation on it-wholly inconsistent with the actual context
itself. Actually the ·Court gave three full instru.ctions on
this .subject-No. 12, No. 13, and No. 14. A reading of all
these three instructions taken together-.a·s they must be
-shows that the District Court fully and clearly told the
jury what the law was-all in accordance with the well
established rules discussed a.bove.
The appellant '.s contention as to this point is wh·olly
without merit.
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II.

Under the pleadings and in accordance with the evidence presented on the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff, the District Court was not only wholly justified
but compelled to instruct the jury on that subject, particularly when the plaintiff -appellant himself requested such
instructions; and the Court's instructions, so given, are
entirely correct.

(Instructions Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10.)
The answer ·of the defendants contains the following
affirmative defense of ·contributory negligence, (A. 1112):
''Further ~answ·ering the con1plaint of plaintiff :and hy way of an affirmative defense thereto
the defendants allege that on the 23rd day of
December, A. D. 1938, the plaintiff was standing
on the travelled portion of the highway at about
2330 South Highland Drive in Salt Lake City,
Utah, and while being ·s'o' then and there, and immediately prior to and at the time of the aecident
alleged in the complaint, the plain tiff acted in a
n·egligent, ·oar.eless, imprudent manner in this:
tha:t at said time :and place the plaintiff failed to
observe any lookout for vehi,cles passing the point
where he ·was standing rand took no precautions
whats,oever to protect himself against being injured in any ma:nn·er .by said vehicles so passing
while the plaintiff was then and there .standing in
the travelled p·ortion of the sraid highway; that if
a small wheel from the hand-truck attached to the
defendant's truck did become d·etached therefrom
a.nd strike the plaintiff's leg, then such a~ccident
and collision was the sole proximate result of the
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neg-ligence ~and carelessness of the plaintiff as
hereinabove set f~orth and \vas not caused proximately or a.t all by any negligent act or omission
on the part of tthe defendants or either of them.''
Under this defense the defendants offered a substantial amount of evidence show·ing the plaintiff to he
g-uilty of contributor~~ negligence, both by their own vvitnesses and by cross examination of the plaintiff's
witnesses.
The Court should 'bear these facts in mind : The
scene of the accident was two blocks south of the tremendously busy Sugar House business district on Highland
Dri\e. Tthe time \vas two days bef,o-re Christmas when
the traffic was unusually heavy. Highland Drive at this
point is a. busy thoroughfare much travelled by motor
vehicles. The plaintiff drove over the scene of the accident four or five times a week and per·sonally knew of
the heavy traffic. The plaintiff was standing in the
street-in the travelled portion ·of the highWta.y and not
on the sidewalk.
Surely under .such conditions a. person is required
to take some measures to protect himself. Y·et the plaintiff admitted on ~cross ·examination that he did absolutely
nothing to ·save himself from any traffic injury. Let him
speak for himself, (T. 28-30):
Q.

·''You were -conversant with the condition of
traffic on that street~

A.

I stop'Ped .at that .address-

Q.

I mean in

general~
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A.

(Continued). Approximately four or five
times a week.

Q.

And have done f.or s•ome

A.

Y·es.

Q.

You also knew t;hat on two days before Christmas there would be mor·e traffic than usual
there, at 4:30 in the afternoon, didn't you~
That is a busy time of the day on that street,
isn't it~

A.

If there is any busy time that is when it would
be.

Q.

There is a lot of traffic-you know that-on
Highland Drive just below 21st South~

A.

Yes sir.

Q. Isn't that
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

time~

so~

Yes.
You testified to this jury that you never
looked toward the east at all, you were standing there with some flowers in your hand, as
I understood JIO·Ur testimony, and you hadn't
looke·d around towar·ds the ·east at all before
this thing hit you~
I wasn't eontemplating going across.
I didn't ask you that. I ,asked you if you
looked towards the east at all, while you vvere
standing there~

A. I was looking at my customer.
Q.

Answer my question. You didn't look towards the east at all before this thing hit
you, did you'

A.

No.

Q.

Did you look down the .street to see if any
ears were coming at :all~
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~\.

X ot until I

(~.

But you didn't before'?

A.

No.

Q.

You didn't eYeu see the truck \Yhich you say
\Yns inYolved in this accident until it had
passed you, you say, one hundred fifty to tvvo
hundred feet J?

A.

That is right.

Q.

~ou

"~as

hit.

didn't look to se-e if a. tn1ck vvas go1ng

byJ?

A. I had no occasion.
now~

Q.

Did you or didn't you,

A.

No.

Q.

Yet, standing there, two days before Christmas, on this street, with heavy traffi.c, knowing that cars were going ~back and forth all
the time, both ways, ynu never even looked
toward the east to see if there was any danger
coming to you at all, did you~

A. IfQ. Did you~ Answer that 'Yes' or 'No'.
A. No .... ''
Surely the foregoing testimony, considered in the
light -of the surrounding ·circumstances, constitutes substantial evidence on the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Consequently, the District Court
was required to submit SllCh evidenee to· the jury with
prop-er instru-ctions.
It is also perfectly apparent that the proof adduced
c-omes .clearly within the scope of the defendant's answer
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setting up the affirmative .defense of contributory negligence. Hence the case of Lo.ckhead v. Jensen, 42 Utah
99, 129 P. 347, cited in Appellant's brief, p. 19, has no
application in the present case.
Any person occupying the travelled portion of a. busy
highway is required to take some n1easures .of precaution
to .protect himself. He cannot simply do nothing in the
way of self-prote·ction and depend entirely on the drivers
of p~assing vehicles to s.a ve him from injury. The kind
and am·ount of precautionary measures he must exercise
depends ·o:n surrounding .circumstances. The test is
whether be did that to protect himself which a reasonable, prudent man would have done under the ~same or
similar circumstances. The situation, there£ore, varies
in the case of a pedestrian, a workman or other pers-on
occupying the travelled p,ortion of the street. The plaintiff here was not a workman in the sense that he was employed by .someone else to perform labor in the street.
Neither w~a.s he strictly speaking a pedestrian merely
moving in the street. In fact he was standing in a dangerous situation in the travelled part of the street on his
own business. That certainly did not relieve him from
exercising any pre-cautions "rhatsoever for his own safety.
So f,ar as the- respondents are advised the latest
pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Utah on this
subject is Reid v. Owens, (Utah, Aug. 31, 1939), 93 P.
(2d) 680, 6H2-3:
''The rule that one working ·on the highway
is not held to so high a. degree of care .as a pe-
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destrian has been applied to \Yorkmen eross1ng
a street as a part of their \Vork. The eireun1stanees may be such in a particular case that a
workman ·crossing a. street in the line of his \York~
tho-ug·h J1e be carrying nothing ,and doing nothing
except crossing, \Yould not be required to exercise
the sa!nle degree of \Yatchfulness as a pedestrian
if barriers or signs have been placed or there is
other eviden·ce of \York ibeing prosecuted on or in
the immediate vicinity of the street; but such a
workman ca.nn,o-t be said to .act as a. reasonably
prudent pers-on under the .cir-cumstances if he is
altogether indifferent to traffic hazards. What is
due care depends on all the surrounding facts and
circumstances. A workman actively laboring in
the street must exercise due care. But that care
must be determined from a different standpoint
than the care to be exercised by a pedestrian on
the same street. The former must devote some
attention to th-e prosecution of his work; the latter is free of .any duty which would interfere with
kee.pin·g a vigilant lookout. A driver of a vehi-cle
being warned by barriers, signs, or other evideuces of the presence of workmen in the street
must in the ·exercise of due care be cognizant of
~he fact that such workmen may. n:ot constantly
attend to traffic, and his conduct should be in the
light of such knowledge. He may not in ease of
injury to such a workman point to the latter's
attention to his work as negligence ·On the latter's
part. But a pedestrian devoting so much of his
attention to other than the traffic as the workman
devoted to his w9rk may well be guilty of contributo-ry negligence. A workman merely crossing
a street sihould doubtless be required to be more
watchful than one sweeping streets, shoveling
.dirt repairing rails, or filling holes, whose duty
not 'only compels him to be in the highway but
also to dev;ote a very large part of his attention
to his work. Thus, in Ellis v. Whitmeyer, supra.,
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where the workman merely crossed the bridg-e as
ordered by lhis foreman he looked for traffic before proceeding .and left an1ple margin for cars
traveling as warned by danger signs. Indeed, the
eourt o-bserved, although applying the rule of
highway wo-rkers, that the plaintiff used such care
as would have been absence of eontributory negligence in a pedestrian. The jury's award was
upheld against a claim of contributory negligence
as a. matter of law.''
·
The instructions of the District ~Court in the present
case state this rule accurately and precisely, especially
in Instruction No.9, (A. 46-47).
It is interesting to note that the appellant in his brief
has no particular ·complaint to make that the District
Court's instructions on contributory negligence incorrectly state the law, but only ·that the ·Court should not
have instructed the jury on that subject at all.
This position becomes altogether incomprehensible
and ludicrous when it is considered that the plaintiffappellant ,himself requested the Court to instruct the
jury on. the subje.ct of eontributory negligence.

This is

found in Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 7, (T. 29):
''If you shall find ·Or ibelieve from the evidence
that ·nn the 23rd day of December, 19'38, in the
2300 block on Highland Drive, the Defendant was
standing behind his truck and that he was struck
by a wheel which became detaclhed from a. hand
truck hanging on the side of the truck being operated by the Defendant N eslen, then you are in·structed that the test for- determining whether the
Plaintiff was contributorily negligent is what a
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reasonable person "\Yould have done under the cir<?lun-stances, ·and· you are instructed t1hat neglig-ene.e is n·ot imputable to a person failing to look
for da:nger if under the surrounding circumstanc.es
he had no cause to apprehend any."
This request by the plaintiff '\vas given by the District Court, and thereupon the Court was required to
give full instructions on the subj.eet of contributory
negligence.
Hou· can. the appeUwnt, havi-ng specifically requested
and received froJn tlze District Court his own instructions
on coHtribu.tory negligence, n·OW assign as error the fact
that the Court follo~ved his own req~test and instructed
the jnry on. that subjBct? Some strange Assignments of
Error no doubt come before the Suprem.e C·ourt from
time to time, ~but the writer ~confesses he has never yet
seen anything so naive as this.

On the question of contributory negligence, therefore, no merit exists in the appe:al beeause, first, there
was substantial, tangible eviden·ce .of the plaintiff's c.ontributory negligence, properly pr.esented under the pleadings; second, the District c·ourt was compelled to submit
this evidence to the jury; and third, in .so doing the Court
gave proper and correct instructions on the ·subject, including ·One request made by the plaintiff himself.
III.

Under the facts of this case the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply and the plaintiff was certainly not
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entitled to a peremptory instruction that the defendants
were negligent as a matter of law; but in that connection
the District Court went as f1a.T as possible in its Instruction
No. 14 in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that the situation warranted an "inference of negligence."

(Instruction No. 14).
Before arguing the legal principles involved in this
point it is well again to remind this Court of the facts
in the present case, because cases which rely upon the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are always de-cided under
their own specific facts.
The plaintiff offered not one word ·Of evidence that
the defendants had any knowledge of any defect in their
truck or that their inspection of it had been at all negligent or unreasonable. On the other hand the defendants presented proof which was not disputed that they
not only did not know of any defect but on the contrary
their use of the hand truck the very day of the accident
and up to one hour before it showed it to be in good
working order and furthermore that they lubricated and
inspe-cted the hand truck once or twice a week.

Does

this set of facts fit into the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur?
The Supreme Court of Utah has in/numerous cases
discussed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The respond·ents here quote only from a few

~of

them.

Zoccolillio v. Oregon Short LineR. R., (Utah, 1918),
53 Utah 39, 61-64; 177 P. 201.
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In that case the Utah Supreme Court reviews all
of the previous Utah cases on the subject.
"'For the purposes of this decision we shall
assu1ne that the n1axim res ipsa loquitur applies
to the heating- of cars. If, however, that fact be
assumed, yet the application .of the maxim does
not shift the burden of proof under any circumstances, and. so far as "\Ve are aware, the courts
haYe uniformly declared to the .contrary. In a
very recent case (\\,..illiamson v. Salt Lake & 0.
Ry. Co., 32 l; tah 84, 172 Pac. 680) we pointed out
that the burden of proof d~oes not shift and .cited
authority to that effect. In an exhaustive note
to the case ·Of Hughes Y. Atlantic City, etc., Rd.
Co., L. R. . . _-\. 1916A, commencing at page 930, a
very large number of cases are cited, in all of
which the doctrine is laid do\vn that the burden
of proof does not shift to the defendant. The
foregoing case originated in the New Jersey
Court .of Errors and Appeals, and is reported
in 85 X. J. Law, 212, 89 Atl. 769, L. R. A. 1916a,
927. We shall later refer to this case more particularly. It may therefore be confidently asserted that the instruction in question was erroneous in charging the jury that the burden of
proof shifted to the ·defendant.
The proposition respecting the presumption
.of negligence is argued with much force by counsel for both parties in their respective briefs.
Defendant's counsel in effect contend that the
maxim of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, is
evidentiary, and merely raises an inference ~of fact
authorizing, but not compelling, a finding of negligence and that such is its effeet in all cases
whethe~ the occurrence of the accident is explained by the defendant or not explained. Upon
the other hand, counsel for plaintiff insist that,
where the maxim .applies, all that the plaintiff is
required to prove is that he was injured through_
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a derailment of a railroad train ·on \Yhich he was
riding as a passenger, or by reason of a collision
between two of defendant's trains, and that after
making ·8Uch proof the presumption arises which,
if unexplained, .compels a finding of negligence~
In other words, plaintiff's counsel eon tend that,
under the circumstances just stated, the court
should direct the jury that the defendant was
guilty of actionable negligence as a matter of
law. It will thus be seen that if the contention
·of plaintiff's counsel is correct, then the question
of burden of proof in most ca.ses is academic
merely, while if the defendant's ·Counsel are right
the ultimate fact of negligence is for the jury, in
view of all the facts and circumstances, whatever
those may be. In the recent case referred to,
namely, Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co.,
supra, we held to the doctrine contended for by
defendant's counsel, following the case of Sweeney
v. Erving, 228 U. S. 240, 33 Sup. Ct. 416., 57 L. Ed.
815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905. Counsel for plaintiff
both in their brief and in the oral argument, criticize the rulings both in the Williamson Case and
in the Sw·eeney Case. If that were admitted,
however, in view of the fact that the· Sweeney
Case emanates from the Supreme Court of the
United States, the court of last resort, and the
Irving Case, just referred to, emanates fr·om
the Court of appeals, the Sweeney Case would
control; but an examination of the Irving Case
will disclos·e that that ·case follows, and does not
contradict, the Sweeney Case. It is there said,
quoting from one ~of the decisions of the Supreme
Court with respect to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur:

'' * * * When a thing which causes
injury, without fault of the injured person, is shown to be under the exclusive
control of the defendant, and the injury is
such as, in the ordinary course of things,
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does not occur if the one having such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation,
that the injury aro~e fro1n the defendant's
"'"ant of care.''
\\nat is there in this quotation which is
contrarv to the S\Yeenev Case? If it affords
merely "'reasonable eviden~ce that simply amounts
to an inference of fact that negligence existed.
In other \Yords, from the occurrence the jury may
infer the ultimate fact of negligence. That is
all that is decided in the \~Villiamson Case. That
is all that is contended for in the Sweeney Case.
Counsel, in effect, contend that the court must
direct a ,~erdict as rna tter of la \V in case no explanation is made. Counsel, however, also insist
that the holding in the \\Tilliamson Case is contrar~~ to former holdings of this court.
With
due respect for counsel's opinion, we, nevertheless, are of a contrary opinion. So far as the
writer is a \Yare, this court has considered the
probative or evidentiary effect of the maxim of
res ipsa loquitur in two, and only two, cases,
namely Christensen vs. Railroad, 35 Utah, 137,
99 Pac. 676, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255, 18 Ann. Cas.
1159, and Furkovich vs. Bingham Coal & Lumber
Co., 45 Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121, L. R. A. 1915B,
426. In both of those cases we clearly indicate
that the effect of the maxim is evidentiary, and
that where it applies negligence, which is the ultimate fact to be established, may be inferred from
a particular occurrence or accident. I? the Christensen Case we followed the rule la1d down by
the Court of Appeals of New York in the case
of Griffen v. Manice, 177 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925,
52 L. R. A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630. In view of
counsel '·s vigorous insistence that the doctrine
laid down in the Williams·on Case is unsound,
we have taken special pains to again exan1ine into
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the subject. No one, even though he has examined
the decisions upon the subject n1erely cursorily,
can, we think, arrive at any other conclusion than
that the decisions are utterly irreconcilable.
Moreover, it is just as apparent to any ·one who
is at all conversant with the subject that most any
one can find something to criticize in at least most
of the decisions. Under such circumstances, the
only reasonable, the only logical, course to pursue is to keep in nrt;ind fwndamental principles
when called upon to decide between the conflicting opinions. It is fundamental that negligence is
neither inferred nor presu,med 1nerely because a
passenger was injured. Nor is negligence presumed as a matter of law. In that regard negligence which constitutes a wrong, like fraud, must
he established. It may, however, always be inferred from other facts and particularly in cases
between carrier and passenger, where a collision
or derailment has occurred. It may be inferred
from ,such ·occurrence, and \\ here no explanation
is offered in such a case the inference may be so
strong as not only to justify, but to compel, a finding of negligence, which is the ultimate fact to be
established. The circumstances ·surrounding the
happenings of an accident, even ~on a railroad,
may, however, easily be such that, while they may
justify a finding of negligence, yet n1ay not compel ,such a finding. In that regard there is no
difference in princi pie between a case where the
maxim of res ipsa loquitur applies and where it
does not; that is, an inference may arise from
one or from a series of facts in any kind of a
case which, if unexplained, may not ~only justify,
but may also require, a finding of the ultimate
fact of negligence. The only difference between
an ordinary ease and a case between carrier and
passenger· consists in the quantun1 of proof the
plaintiff must adduce in order to 1nake a prima
facie case. True, courts in applying the maxim
of res ipsa loquitur very frequently speak of the
7
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presun1ption 'vhieh arises, etc. B·lJ readinq the
decision it, hou'erer, becoHles clear that at· least
most zurifers refer to the presumption so ca.lled
merelY_ as an inference of fact, and not as a presum.pflon req_niring the cou.rt to direct a verdict,
even thou.gh no explanat·ion is offered." (Italics
ours).

In connection \Yith the Utah cases, this court should
keep in mind the District Court's Instruction N·o. 14 in
the present case which reads, (A. 49) :
''You are instructed that if you should find
fr-om a preponderance of the evidence that the
'• dolly'' wheel \Yas thrown or projected from
d~fendants' truck as it passed the place where
plaintiff was standing and struck plaintiff inflicting the injuries complained of, such. finding
is alone sufficient to raise an inference of negligence on the part of the defendants which you
may, but need not apply. Unless you should find
that such inference of negligence is ·Overcome
from all the ·evidence in the case you should find
for the plaintiff.''
Angerman Co. v. Edgerman,
(Utah, 1930), 290 P. 169, 171.

''In the case of Zoccolillio v. Oregon Short
LineR. Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 P. 201, 210, this court
expounds the doctrine of res ipsa l·oquitur and
refers to the previous cases in this court where
the subject has been discussed. The rule which
is quoted with approval in that case, taken fron1
the case of Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 240, 33
S. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905,
is as follows:
''When a thing which causes injury,
without fault of the injured person, is
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shown to be under the .exclusive control of
the defendant, and the injury is such as,
in the ordinary course of things, does not
occur if the one having such control uses
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that
the injury arose fr,om the defendant's
want of care.''
It is further made to appear in that ca.se
that ''the effect of the maxim is evidentiary, and
that where it applies negligence, which is the
ultimate fact to be established, may be inferred
from a particular ·occurrence or accident.'' In
some cases the inference may be so strong, where
no explanation is offered, as not only to justify,
but to compel, a finding of negligence ; but ordinarily all that is meant by the maxim is that proof
of the facts embraced within the statement of
the rule affords reasonable evidence from which
the jury, or the court, if the case be tried without
a jury, may, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, infer that the injury arose from the
defendant's want of cares.''
The Angerman case was printed in 79 A. L. R. 40
and is followed on page 48 by an enlightening annotation on the subject.

Kendall v. Fordham,
(Utah, 1932), 9 P. (2d) 183;
Jenson v. S. H. Kress d!; Co.,
(Utah, 1935), 49 P. (2d) 958-960.
''Appellant con tends that this case is directly
controlled by the case of Quinn v. Utah Gas &
Coke Co., 42 Utah, 113, 129 P. 362, 43 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 328. Respondent contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquiture applies.
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,,. . e cannot see ho\v this case differs fro In the
Quinn Case. In that case a bottle of ink had
spilled, and plain tiff's dress was damaged by
ink running up.on it. In this ·Case there was a
cracked panel in the ·showcase and the person of
plaintiff \Yas injured. In neither case did any one
kno\Y how the ink \Yas spilled or the glass broken.
In both cases the cause of the spilled ink or the
broken glass 1nay haYe been caused by the customer ''ho \Vas damag·ed or by another customer,
·or may have been caused by some representative
of the company \Yithout negligence and unnoticed
when it was done, or, in both cases, it may have
been caused by the negligence of the company
through a serYant. The difficulty is that it is
in the realm of speculation, and under such circumstances the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot apply. It applies ''here the thing from or
by \Yhich the apparent negligence speaks is shown
to be under the control or the 1nanagement of the
store and the accident is such as, in the ordinary
course of things, does not or would not happen
if those """ho had the management used the proper
care. '\llere the way in which the accident happened warrants an inference of negligence then
the mere happening speaks for itself. Even then
it is only evidence from which the jury may infer
negligence. It is not negligence in law. See
Williams-on v. Salt Lake & Ogden R. Co., 52 Utah
84, 172 P. 680, L. R. A. 1918F, 588. If the circumstances are equally consistent ·with a cause
which would not be attributable to negligence,
then the doctrine does not apply. The stage is set
for the happening of the accident as the victim
walks upon it. If, fr,onl the set stage as it was
before the accident happened, it can be inferred
from the setting itself that there was an omission
or commission of the manag.ement amounting to
negligence, then the thing itself speaks.''
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Such are the recent Utah cases on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. In view of what they hold, it is perfectly clear that the District c;ourt 's Instruction No. 14
exactly complied with their views. Even though an "inference of negligence'' under that instruction arose,
yet the positive evidence of the defendants that no knowledge of a defect or negligence in as-certaining it existed,
coupled with a complete lack of proof of negligence by the
plaintiff-yet the ''inference'' was ·overcome and the
entire question could be resolved by the jury.
In the light of the Utah cases quoted above and
particularly in the light of the facts of the present cause,
it is clear that the Utah coal case of Furkovich v~. Bing'ham Coal and Lumber Co., 45 Utah 89; 143 P. 121, cited
on page 9 of the appellant's brief, has no application
here.
It f.ollows that the appellant's attempt to avail himself here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is without
merit, and if there were the slightest doubt about the
matter it is completely resolved by the District Court's
Instruction No. 14.

With great deference to the Court and to opposing
eouns.el, the wtiter of this brief, after some considerable experience in appellate practice, feels constrained
to say that this is the most trivial and inconsequential
appeal he has yet encountered. Not only is this so
because of the weakness of the appellant's legal argu-
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ments but particularly because of the superficiality of
the plaintiff's injuries. These facts should not be ~over
looked: (a) the plaintiff is an able bodied man of ~3:2,
six feet tall, "~eighing 212 pounds 'vho lost no vYeight
or appetite follow·ing the accident; (b) the front of the
left leg where the w·heel struck 'vas only silghtly bruised,
and required no surgical aid and "\vas not even bandaged;
(c) the slight ~~~ inch cut on the back of the leg was
treated only "\Yith an antiseptic; (d) the plaintiff sa"T
his doctor only three times ; (e) he never lost a single
day's work after the accident but continued to drive his
truck eYery day. Small wonder that the jury promptly
broug·ht in a verdict of "no cause of acti,on''.
The respondents urge this Honorable Court to affirm
the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
GARDNER

&

LATIMER,

Attorneys for Respondents.
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